THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF
DUAL FEDERALISM
ERNEST A. YOUNG

It may seem strange that, more than sixty years after Edward Corwin famously lamented "The Passing of Dual Federalism,"1 this
essay is part of a panel organized under the title "Against Dual
Federalism." Accusations that the Court was trying to revive federalism were commonplace in the early years of the Rehnquist
Court's "federalist revival." I argued more than a decade ago that
these charges were misplaced, and that the actual doctrines that
the Court was articulating in cases like United States v. Lopez2 and
Printz v. United States^ could not really fit into the rubric of dual
federalism.4 It is not that I'm surprised to find that my counsel has
not been universally heeded; I have, after all, two teenage children. But I would think that by now the Court has made clear that
it does not mean to impose particularly significant limits on the
Commerce Clause,5 much less to bring back the entire dual federalist regime. Dual federalism remains hardly less dead than it was
the day after the Court decided Wickard v. Filburn6—a case that
the Rehnquist Court repeatedly went out of its way to reaffirm and
that the Roberts Court has not questioned.
Part of the problem is that not everyone means the same thing
by "dual federalism." The legal literature on federalism uses the
term to describe a particular model of allocating functions between the national government and the states, characterized by an
34
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attempt to define separate and exclusive spheres for national and
state action.7 That model, I shall argue, is largely dead insofar as it
operates as a check on national action; it survives, in a somewhat
softer form, as a check on state action. But the latter aspect—dual
federalism as a way of protecting national authority from incursions by the states—is not what generally concerns dual federalism's critics.
Those critics frequently equate "dual federalism" with any effort
to impose constitutional federalism-based limitations on national
authority. In the essay to which this commentary responds, for
example, Sotirios Barber contrasts dual federalism with "Marshallian federalism," which he takes to be equivalent to the managerial "decentralization" model long advocated by Malcolm Feeley
and Edward Rubin. 8 This sort of position objects not only to a
"separate spheres" model but to any model of federalism featuring
guarantees of state autonomy that are constitutionally entrenched.
Conflating concepts in this way, however, tends not only to confuse
discussion but also to obscure the reasons that some approaches to
federalism fail while others have more staying power.
This essay considers two ways in which notions of dual federalism persist. The first is the tendency of commentators to insist
that the Supreme Court is bent on reviving strict dual federalist limits on national power, even when what the Court actually
says and does makes rather clear that it is not. This persistence,
in other words, is in the minds of the Court's critics—including
Professor Barber, in his essay for this book. The second mode
of persistence, however, is reflected in the Court's rhetoric and
doctrine. That is the use of dual federalist notions to limit state
power, by defining distinct and exclusive spheres of national regulatory activity. In preemption cases, for example, courts have
found state law more readily preempted when it intrudes on a
sphere of uniquely national concern, such as foreign relations
or immigration.
I contend that the Court's critics are right to condemn dual federalism, but wrong to think that the Court has revived dual federalist limits on national power. Properly defined, "dual federalism" connotes separate and exclusive spheres of state and federal
authority; it thus exists in contrast to other models of federalism,
such as "cooperative" federalism, "collective action" federalism,
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and "process" federalism. All of these models may rely on principles of dual sovereignty—that is, the broader notion that guarantees
of state autonomy vis-a-vis the center should be constitutionally
entrenched. While the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have revived
this broader principle, they have not attempted to define a separate sphere of state authority that the national government cannot enter.
Dual federalism died in the middle of the twentieth century
because the Court found itself unable to draw determinate lines to
define the exclusive sphere of state authority into which national
power might not enter. That problem applies equally, however,
to attempts to define and police an exclusive sphere of national
authority; it thus plagues the contemporary cases in which courts
have sought to keep states out of "uniquely federal" fields like
foreign affairs, national banking, or immigration. But the linedrawing problem is not inherent in all efforts to protect other
forms of state sovereignty; I thus reject Professor Barber's more
general critique of dual sovereignty in all its forms. If we are to
keep faith with our constitutional commitments, then federalism
is not optional. As Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge have written, " [c] onstitutional law must make some sense of federalism."9

1. SOME D E F I N I T I O N S

It will help to begin by defining some terms. Words like "dual federalism" are used in a variety of ways in the literature, and I do
not mean to suggest that the definitions offered here are the only
plausible ones. I do think that the conceptual distinctions drawn
here matter, both theoretically and practically, and that whatever
terms we happen to use, it will help to be more explicit about precisely what we mean.
"Dual Federalism " versus "Dual Sovereignty "
Alpheus Mason described "dual federalism" as contemplating "two
mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power—that
of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each other as equals across a precise constitutional
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line, defining their respective jurisdictions." 10 In his famous essay,
Edward Corwin said that dual federalism entailed four "postulates":
[1.] The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2.
Also the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3.
Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are
"sovereign" and hence "equal"; 4. The relation of the two centers
with each other is one of tension rather than collaboration."
Although Professor Corwin's postulates are somewhat more elaborate than Mason's definition, both statements share a common
theme: Article I's limits on Congress's powers and purposes (postulates 1 and 2) define separate "spheres" of sovereignty for the
federal and state governments (postulate 3), neither of which permits intrusion or activity by the other level of government (postulate 4). It is this notion of separate "spheres" or "enclaves" that has
set dual federalism apart from other approaches to federalism for
later generations of commentators. 12
I want to distinguish dual federalism from dual sovereignty, although I acknowledge that the two terms are often used interchangeably. While dual federalism refers to a particular relationship between national and state authorities, I use "dual sovereignty"
more generally to describe the Federalists' great innovation in
political theory, which accommodated the separate authority of
the states to classical political theory's requirement of a single "sovereign" in every polity by lodging that ultimate sovereignty in the
American people. 13 As Justice Souter has explained, "[T]he People possessing this plenary bundle of specific powers were free to
parcel them out to different governments and different branches
of the same government as they saw fit."14 Dual sovereignty thus
means that the federal and state governments are "each sovereign,
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign
with respect to the objects committed to the other."15
There is, of course, much disagreement about the precise meaning of what Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff called "the lawyer's
disease of sovereignty."16 In our constitutional system, neither the
national government nor the states possess the sort of unquestionable ultimate authority that the European theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant by "sovereignty."17 The
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Federalists thus used "dual sovereignty" as something of a debating point, co-opting the rhetoric of their opponents while advocating something completely different from the traditional unitary
authority of the king in Parliament. 18 And "sovereignty" is an even
more contested term in our contemporary political environment,
constandy under threat from policy concerns that disrespect territorial boundaries, broad conceptions of individual rights against
government, the proliferation of international law and institutions, and the rise of complex intergovernmental institutional arrangements that blur traditional jurisdictional lines.19
Nonetheless, "dual sovereignty" does capture an important truth
about American federalism: although nonfederal regimes may
make the political choice to decentralize certain functions, the
"sovereignty" of the states and the federal government means that
at least some elements of the American allocation of authority are
enforceable as a matter of legal right. This, for Edward Rubin and
Malcolm Feeley, is the key distinction between "federalism" and
"decentralization." 20 What "dual sovereignty" means in practice is
that the federal arrangement is constitutionally entrenched— that is,
it cannot be changed without constitutional amendment, which is
of course very difficult to do. 21
This element of entrenchment is critical to a wide range of definitions of federalism in both law and political science. Jenna Bednar, for example, defines a federal system as one meeting "three
structural criteria"—geopolitical division according territory to
each state unit, independent electoral bases of authority for state
and national governments, and "policy sovereignty" for each level
of government over some issues.22 Importantly, she presumes that
each of these structural characteristics must be constitutionally
entrenched. 23 And the Supreme Court, of course, has long maintained that "'the preservation of the States, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design and care of
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.' "24
Much of our federalism, of course, is not entrenched. As I have
argued elsewhere, in many ways the most practically important
boundaries between, national and state authority are set by federal

The Puzzling Persistence ofDual Federalism

39

statutes, agency regulations, or even defeasible judicial doctrines
like the dormant Commerce Clause,25 and perhaps it would be better if we spent more time talking about those arrangements and
less time arguing about sovereignty.26 But as will be apparent, it
remains an important point of division in debates about federalism whether any element of the federal arrangement is not subject
to change through ordinary law.
Professor Barber seems to mean something like dual sovereignty when he says "dual federalism." He says, for instance, that
"[d]ual federalism . . . sees the Constitution as a collection of
restraints on the national government, one kind of restraint being
'states' rights.' "27 This is hardly the only thing that dual sovereignty
means; as I have argued elsewhere, the point of state sovereignty is
not simply to limit national power but also to preserve the states'
ability to provide beneficial regulation and governmental services
to their citizens.28 But the key difference between dual sovereignty
and the model of managerial decentralization proposed by Professors Feeley and Rubin is whether states do, in fact, have legally
enforceable "rights" against the national authority. When Barber
argues in favor of a national "authority to delegate and recall
responsibility"29 vis-a-vis the states, he is arguing not only against
dual federalism but against dual sovereignty as well.
The key point for present purposes is that "dual sovereignty"
is a broader term than "dual federalism"; the former holds that
ultimate authority is split between two types of governments in our
political system, while the latter describes a particular model for
what that division of authority might look like. Defining separate
and exclusive spheres of state and national authority is one way to
maintain a regime of dual sovereignty, but as I discuss in the next
section, there are others as well.30 We might, for instance, focus on
the institutional integrity of state governments themselves, or on
the political mechanisms by which their interests are represented
in the political process.
Professor Barber is thus right to argue that "the dual federalist
view . . . is an option to be weighed against competing options; it's
not a conclusion compelled by constitutional language, logic, or
history."31 But that is correct only in the limited sense in which I
am using "dual federalism" here. That model is one among several that is consistent with "constitutional language, logic, [and]
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history." But to the extent that Barber is using "dual federalism"
in a broader sense—that is, to connote a commitment to some
meaningful principle of state sovereignty and a "limited [national]
government" vis-a-vis the states—that commitment is not constitutionally optional. 32 This is well-trod ground in the literature, and
surely any assertion that the Constitution contains no such princir
pie ought to grapple with the great weight of both jurisprudential
and scholarly authority to the contrary.33
In rejecting any entrenched notion of dual sovereignty, Professor Barber relies on Madison's statement that "as far as the sovereignty of the states cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the
people . . . let the former be sacrificed to the latter."34 It is critical
to remember, however, that Madison was arguing at a stage when
the Constitution had not yet been adopted. After all, he said the
same thing about the Constitution itself ("Were the plan of the
Convention adverse to the public happiness, my advice would be,
reject the plan.") and the Union ("Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, [my advice] would be, abolish
the Union."). 35 The people having made their choice to adopt the
set of institutional arrangements offered in the Philadelphia draft
(including a significant measure of state sovereignty), one can no
longer repair directly to the public welfare as a reason to reject,
state sovereignty without disregarding the binding force of the
Constitution as law.36
This disagreement may simply reflect a difference (at least in
emphasis) between my job, as a professor of law, and Professor
Barber's, as a professor of political science. Law has a more limited scope than political science for arguments directly from general principles of public welfare. As Justice O'Connor observed in
New York v. United States, "[o]ur task would be the same even if one
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It
consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but
of understanding and applying the framework set forth in the
Constitution." 37 It is thus all well and good to argue that a system of
nonentrenched decentralization would better pursue particularly
national conceptions of liberty and other values, but lawyers and
judges are limited by obligations of fidelity to the law that stand
apart from these values.38
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Alternatives to Dual Federalism
Dual federalism provided the model for our law of intergovernmental relations for roughly the first century and a half of our
national existence. It died, for reasons I shall canvass shortly, in
the New Deal revolution of 1937. And in truth, for much of the
time since 1937 there has seemed to be little left of dual sovereignty
either, as the Supreme Court has frequently seemed reluctant to
enforce any constitutional limits on national authority. As I have
already suggested, however, dual sovereignty-based limits can take
a variety of forms that do not involve an attempt to define and
police separate and exclusive spheres of state and national authority. I sketch some of those alternative models in this section. I
begin, however, with the nationalist model that Professor Barber
appears to advocate.
Managerial Decentralization or "Marshallian Federalism"
It is a little hard to know for sure what Professor Barber means by
"Marshallian federalism." He offers a definition at the outset of his
essay: "Marshallian federalism holds that when the nation's government is pursuing authorized constitutional ends it may freely disregard the reserved powers of the states."39 But that formulation is
perfectly consistent with "dual federalism" as it has been described
in the literature and practiced by the Court; everything turns, of
course, on what "constitutional ends" the national government is
"authorized" to pursue. Dual federalism held that those ends are
confined to a distinct sphere of governmental activity, but because
that sphere is exclusive, the states could have no reserved powers
to get in the way. If Barber's target is simply the notion that a state
may interpose its own law to block the effect of a national law that
falls within Congress's enumerated powers, then he is truly pushing on an open door.
It is clear from Professor Barber's discussion, I think, that he
means something more restrictive than this. Throughout his essay,
he decries the notion of enforceable "states' rights" and urges
that the national authority should be able to pursue national
ends—like liberty or democracy—by calibrating the allocation of
power between national and state institutions as the circumstances
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dictate. 4 0 T h e implicit assumption seems to b e that the national
g o v e r n m e n t will always b e "better" on issues of democracy than
those of the states. While that is certainly sometimes true, it has n o t
always b e e n t h e case. 41 Recognizing this reality, A l e x a n d e r H a m ilton (not exactly a states' righter) emphasized the n e e d for both
state a n d national g o v e r n m e n t s to serve as checks o n o n e a n o t h e r :
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the
state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards
the general government. . . . If [the people's] rights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. 42
Professor Barber, by contrast, would dispense with the states' checking function. His federalism, like Professors Rubin a n d Feeley's
decentralization, "is a managerial concept," n o t a m a t t e r of constitutional principle; Barber's polity, like theirs, is "hierarchically
organized a n d the leaders at the top or c e n t e r have plenary power
over the o t h e r m e m b e r s of the organization." 4 3 This view, whatever
its merits, is the antithesis of dual sovereignty.
More fundamentally, Professors Rubin a n d Feeley have a r g u e d
that "the p o i n t of federalism"—as o p p o s e d to decentralization—
"is to allow normative d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g s t the s u b o r d i n a t e units
so that different units can subscribe to different value systems." 44
But it is t h e very possibility of legitimate normative d i s a g r e e m e n t
that Professor Barber seems to reject:
Locating constitutional authority in one place, instead of thirteen
or fifty, is necessary because the decision to delegate discretion or
recall it must flow from one judgment regarding ends and means.
Liberty is best served if the best feasible conception of liberty is
served. Some authority has to judge among competing conceptions
in particular situations. . . . One institution is obviously superior to
many because to be effective many institutions would have to concur in one conclusion or one consistent set of conclusions regarding means and ends. 45
O n e wonders if the American political system is really set u p to
r e n d e r such a unitary conception of the good, even if we disregard
the states. N o t only is Congress a "they," n o t an "it,"46 with notoriously multifarious a n d discordant conceptions of the good, b u t
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the national separation of powers envisions perpetual c o m p e t i t i o n
between legislative, executive, a n d judicial institutions that may
each h a r b o r its own conceptions of liberty, democracy, or g o o d
policy. In any event, w h e n Barber argues that o u r constitutional
structure entails "a substantive c o m m i t m e n t — a n overarching a n d
controlling view of the g o o d life within which s u b o r d i n a t e views
must find a place as contributing views," 47 h e plainly takes issue
not only with the narrow m o d e l of "dual federalism" b u t with any
m o d e l that envisions constitutional restraints o n national authority vis-a-vis the states. T h a t puts Barber squarely in the Rubin a n d
Feeley c a m p .
Professor Barber describes his view as "Marshallian federalism,"
but the position h e describes is plainly n o t J o h n Marshall's federalism. Barber provides n o evidence for his claim that "Marshall's
constitutionalism would c o m m i t the nation to a more-or-less spe^
cine way of life." 48 O t h e r students of Marshall have c o n c l u d e d that
"a constitution . . . is m a d e for p e o p l e of fundamentally differing views." 49 More to the point, Chief Justice Marshall repeatedly
insisted that the Constitution limits national power. In McCulloch,
for example, Marshall warned that " [ s j h o u l d Congress, in the
execution of its powers, a d o p t measures which are p r o h i b i t e d by
the constitution; or should Congress, u n d e r the p r e t e x t of executing its powers, pass laws for the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of objects n o t
entrusted to the g o v e r n m e n t ; it would b e c o m e the painful duty
of this tribunal . . . to say that such an act was n o t the law of the
land." 50 A n d in Gibbons, Marshall went so far as to articulate n o t
simply dual sovereignty b u t the "separate spheres" n o t i o n of dual
federalism typical of his age:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that
its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation,
and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but
not to those which are completely within a particular State, which
do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers
of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State,
then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.51
It is certainly true that the thrust of the Great Chief Justice's
federalism decisions was to carve o u t a place for the fledgling
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national g o v e r n m e n t a n d rein in the centrifugal impulses of the
states. But that hardly m e a n s that Marshall stood ready to aband o n all constitutional constraints o n national power, a n d o n e can
readily imagine that h e would b e shocked at the e x t e n t of national
authority today. It is n o coincidence that Rubin a n d Feeley, u p o n
w h o m Barber seems to p a t t e r n his position, bill t h e i r managerial
c o n c e p t of decentralization as a m o d e r n r e m e d y for a n o u t d a t e d
"neurosis." Certainly t h e r e is n o t h i n g traditional, let alone Marshallian, a b o u t it.
Cooperative (and Uncooperative) Federalism
Cooperative federalism eschews t h e separate s p h e r e s of dual federalism a n d embraces the reality that, in m o d e r n America, "virtually
all g o v e r n m e n t s are involved in virtually all functions. . . . [T] h e r e
is hardly any activity t h a t d o e s n o t involve t h e federal, state, a n d
some local g o v e r n m e n t in i m p o r t a n t responsibilities." 5 2 Philip
Weiser has explained:
In contrast to a dual federalism, cooperative federalism envisions
a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government
and the states that allows states to regulate within a framework delineated by federal law. In particular, modern regulatory programs put
in place across a variety of fields ranging from nearly all environmental programs to telecommunications regulation to health care
. . . all embrace a unified federal structure that includes a role for
state implementation. 53
U n d e r cooperative federalism, t h e n , national authorities d o n o t
merely possess c o n c u r r e n t regulatoryjurisdiction; the actual activity of each g o v e r n m e n t is closely integrated with that of the other. 5 4
Advocates of constitutional limitations o n national authority
have often r e g a r d e d cooperative federalism with suspicion, seeing the s u b o r d i n a t e role of state officials within federal regulatory
schemes as reflecting a "concentration of political powers in the
national government." 5 5 Larry Kramer has p o i n t e d out, however,
that in a cooperative system, " [t] h e federal g o v e r n m e n t needs the
states as m u c h as the reverse, a n d this m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c y guarantees state officials a voice in the process." 5 6 H e concedes that this
is " [ n ] o t necessarily a n equal voice: because federal law is s u p r e m e
a n d Congress holds the purse strings, the federal g o v e r n m e n t is

The Puzzling Persistence ofDual Federalism

45

bound to prevail if push comes to shove. But federal dependency
on state administrators gives federal officials an incentive to see
that push doesn't come to shove, or at least that this happens
as seldom as possible, and that means taking state interests into
account."57 More recently, Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have taken this insight and run with it to develop a model
of "uncooperative federalism," which "occurs when states carrying out the Patriot Act refuse to enforce the portions they deem
unconstitutional, when states implementing federal environmental law use that power to push federal authorities to take a new
position, or when states relying on federal funds create welfare
programs that erode the foundations of the very policies they are
being asked to carry out."58 This phenomenon, they note, occurs
"in such varied arenas as immigration, healthcare, and education.
In each of these fields, states use regulatory power conferred by
the federal government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from
federal law."59
One may think of "uncooperative federalism" as a particular
form of Morton Grodzins's general idea of "decentralization by
mild chaos."60 Despite the absence of clear lines demarcating state
and national power, the reality of multiple power centers and
the myriad opportunities to exert influence guarantee meaningful checks on central authority. Thus described, however, uncooperative federalism seems like a practical consequence of particular institutional forms of managerial decentralization, rather
than an alternative model of dual sovereignty. Nonetheless, at
least some approaches to cooperative federalism retain a place
for sovereignty.
In particular, the anticommandeering doctrine imposes an important constitutional constraint on Congress's ability to enlist
the states as implementers of federal law. That doctrine holds that
Congress may not require the legislative and executive institutions of state government to enact legislation pursuant to federal
directives, enforce the requirements of federal law, or otherwise
serve as the instruments—as opposed to the objects—of federal
regulation.61 Because Congress may not simply command such
implementation, it must secure the states' consent by making participation in the federal scheme attractive. Likewise, constitutional
constraints on Congress's authority to condition grants of federal
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monies on state acquiescence in federal mandates 52 ensure that
states retain some enforceable rights against the national government even in cooperative federalism schemes. The presence of
these constraints ensures that some aspects of the federal structure
remain constitutionally entrenched, even within a cooperative federalism scheme.
Subsidiarity or Collective Action Federalism
A second model of dual sovereignty reasons from the underlying
values that a federal system is meant to serve. Donald Regan has
argued, for example, that "in thinking about whether the federal
government has the power to do something or other, we should
ask what special reason there is for the federal government to have
that power. What reason is there to think the states are incapable
or untrustworthy?"63 Professor Regan's approach bears a strong
family resemblance to the European Union's principle of "subsidiarity," under which "the Community shall take action . . . only if
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and therefore by reason of
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by
the Community."64 The Member States of the EU added subsidiarity to the EU's governing treaties as a result of fears that the
original documents—which like the American Constitution relied
on specific enumerations of the EU's powers—were insufficiently
protective of Member State prerogatives.65
In this country, the most extended and thoughtful attempt to
realize a subsidiarity-type approach to federalism is the recent work
of Robert Cooter and my colleague Neil Siegel. Professors Cooter
and Siegel read the Constitution's power grants to Congress in
Article I, Section 8 as embodying a single coherent principle of
"collective action federalism."66 In their view, "the clauses of Section 8 . . . authorizfe] Congress to tax, spend, and regulate when
two or more states face collective action problems. Conversely, governmental activities that do not pose collective action problems
for the states are 'internal to a state' or 'local.' "67 Congress would
therefore be able to legislate to solve a collective action problem
whether or not the legislation regulated commercial activity; on
the other hand, even regulation of buying and selling might fall
outside Congress's power if it did not respond to some difficulty
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preventing resolution of the problem through action by individual states.
The principal difficulty with subsidiarity-based approaches is
that they tend to collapse the constitutional question ("What does
the Constitution permit?") into the policy question ("What would
it be desirable for Congress to do?"). As numerous commentators have noted, this makes subsidiarity inquiries particularly difficult for courts, which ordinarily depend for their legitimacy on
the supposition that they simply enforce the law without secondguessing Congress's policy judgments—that they exercise "judgment," not "will," in Alexander Hamilton's memorable account. 68
This difficulty has bedeviled efforts to enforce subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in the European Union, 69 and commentators
(including this one) have raised similar concerns with efforts to
develop a similar approach on this side of the pond. 70
One may also worry that this logic, taken too far, would leave
precious little to the States. As Morton Grodzins pointed out long
ago, "[IJnequities of state resources, disparities in educational
facilities and results, the gap between actual and potential educational services, and, above all, the adverse national consequences
that might follow long-term inadequacies of state-local control
would almost certainly, if the choice had to be made, establish
education as the exclusive concern of the national government." 71
One suspects that similar arguments could be made in almost
any field if one's conception of a collective action problem is sufficiently broad. And to the extent that courts defer to legislative
judgments in order to avoid crossing the line into policy making,
they will be leaving the foxes in charge of the henhouse. 72
The important point for present purposes, however, is that subsidiarity or collective action federalism represents a distinct model
of dual sovereignty from dual federalism. It retains an aspect of
sovereignty because, according to the model's proponents, the
notion that some collective action problem must exist to justify
national action is an interpretation of Article I, Section 8—that
is, it is an entrenched part of the Constitution. National action
without such a justification would thus be unconstitutional. And
yet collective action problems—or their absence—may occur in
virtually any area of regulatory concern. This approach thus does
not yield the separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory activity
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that characterized dual federalism.73 Some aspects of criminal law,
or environmental law, or any other field will raise collective action
problems, while others may not. The justification for any given
national endeavor must be judged on its own merits, regardless of
the field in which it occurs.
Process Federalism
Process federalism has its unlikely origins in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority1*—a case that William Van Alstyne
decried as the "second death of federalism."75 Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion in Garcia asserted that "the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce
Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than
one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural
nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather
than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.'" 76 Process
federalism thus eschews the exclusive subject matter spheres of
state and national authority that characterize dual federalism.
Instead, it relies on the political and institutional structure of the
national government itself to preserve the autonomy of the states.
As Professor Van Alstyne's memorable phrase suggests, Garcia
was initially either lamented or hailed as the end of the line for
state sovereignty.77 Both friends and foes of constitutional limitations on national authority assumed that the abandonment of substantive limits really connoted an abandonment of any limits at all.
This turned out not to be true, however. Just as John Hart Ely has
shown that a process-based theory of individual rights can provide
a powerful basis for judicial review,78 so too process federalism has
turned out to provide vigorous protection for state autonomy.79 In
both instances, process theory simply shifts the focus from the substantive character of governmental action to the institutional process by which the government acts.
Professor Ely's idea was that our system of government ordinarily safeguards individual liberties through the political process of
democratic representation; courts play a supporting role, stepping
in whenever there is reason to believe that the ordinary democratic process has become skewed (e.g., through restrictions on
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political participation) or particular groups have been systematically excluded (e.g., racial minorities). 80 Process federalism similarly builds on Herbert Wechsler's insight (derived in turn from
James Madison and John Marshall) that the first-line protection
for federalism in our governmental system is the political representation of the states in Congress.81 Building on Wechsler, other
scholars have stressed the role of political parties as well as more
particular institutional features, such as the role of state legislatures in redistricting for federal congressional districts.82
Other process federalists have emphasized the procedural protections that states derive from the many impediments to federal lawmaking. As Brad Clark has explained, "The lawmaking procedures
prescribed by the Constitution safeguard federalism in an important respect simply by requiring the participation and assent of
multiple actors. These procedures make federal law more difficult
to adopt by creating a series of 'veto gates.' . . . [T]he imposition of
cumbersome federal lawmaking procedures suggests that the Constitution reserves substantive lawmaking power to the states and
the people both by limiting the powers assigned to the federal government and by rendering that government frequently incapable
of exercising them." 83
Supreme Court doctrine has reinforced these political and procedural safeguards of federalism in a variety of ways. Most important, the Court has constructed an array of "clear statement"
rules of statutory construction, triggered whenever Congress acts
in a way that implicates the prerogatives a n d / o r autonomy of the
states. These rules require a clear expression of Congress's intent
before a federal statute may be construed to regulate the public
functions of state governments, 84 impose financial liability on the
states,85 abrogate state sovereign immunity,86 impose conditions
on the grant of federal funds to state governments, 87 or preempt
state law.88 While these canons of statutory construction are not
uncontroversial,89 they are best understood as an extension of the
underlying federalist constitutional principles.90 They enhance the
political safeguards of federalism by requiring proponents of federal laws affecting the states to put the states' defenders in Congress on notice; they enhance the procedural safeguards by adding an additional drafting hurdle that legislation implicating state
autonomy must surmount. As a practical matter, it is fair to say that
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the Court's clear statement cases have preserved a great deal more
state autonomy than its largely symbolic efforts to police the substantive boundaries of the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, one can best understand the anticommandeering
doctrine of New York and Printzm as a tool of process federalism.
Federal commandeering—that is, the power of Congress to require state institutions to implement federal law—-allows national
authorities to foist many of the costs of national action onto state
institutions. These include financial costs, because states must bear
the costs of implementation without any requirement that Congress reimburse them, and political costs, because state officials
often become the public face of unpopular federal programs (like
nuclear waste disposal in New York and limits on gun purchases in
Printz).92 The anticommandeering doctrine does not, in practice,
prevent the states from implementing federal law; as I have already
said, cooperative federalism arrangements are pervasive in our system. But because the doctrine requires Congress to solicit rather
than command state implementation, the states can insist on compensation for their expenses and refuse to participate in the most
unpopular programs. 93 This measure of independence from outright federal control may also enhance the ability of state administrators within cooperative federalism regimes to use the administrative process to influence a n d / o r resist federal policy.
Professor Barber makes some very odd assertions about process
federalism; for instance, he claims that the process federalist "will
eventually claim that the only good anyone can really know is pleasure centered on the individual human body."941 suspect this conclusion would come as a major surprise to scholars (like this one)
who have long advocated process federalism. As I have already suggested, it may be more constructive to engage the arguments that
process federalists actually make—Barber's essay is devoid of citation to any work that actually discusses process federalism—than
to theorize about what arguments process federalists must make.
In any event, what actually distinguishes process-based from dual
federalism models is simply the former's focus on the political and
procedural dynamics by which the states participate in the national
political process and federal actors construct supreme federal law.
Get those dynamics right, the process federalist contends, and
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one need not worry about whether particular national initiatives
intrude into some protected state sphere of authority.
Immunity Federalism
A final model is rarely discussed distinctively in the literature but
is quite prominent in the Court's case law. That model is "immunity federalism," which seeks to protect the institutions of state
government themselves from being subjected to or held accountable for violations of national law.95 Dual federalism emphasized
affirmative authority to regulate—that is, to prescribe legal rules
governing the conduct of nongovernmental actors. It was thus
concerned, for example, with whether national or state authorities get to control the legal regime governing public education or
immigration. Immunity federalism, by contrast, is relatively unconcerned with affirmative regulatory jurisdiction; it sets no limits on
the scope of national regulatory authority over private individuals. This model concerns national regulation solely as it impacts
the institutions of state governments themselves. A good example
is thus National League of Cities v. Usery96 which did not challenge
Congress's authority to regulate the wages and hours of all privately employed workers in the United States but did restrict its
right to apply those regulations to state governmental employees.
The most obvious flowering of immunity federalism has, of
course, occurred in the Supreme Court's cases construing the sovereign immunity of states from lawsuits by private individuals and
corporations. More than a century ago, in Hans v. Louisiana,97 the
Court construed the scope of this immunity to extend significantly
beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which had generally
been considered the source of state sovereign immunity.98 Much
more recendy, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida99 the Court held that Congress may not subject states to suit when they violate federal law
by enacting statutes that "abrogate" the states' immunity, at least
when Congress acts pursuant to its Article I powers. Subsequent
decisions have extended this principle to suits in state courts and
before federal administrative agencies, notwithstanding the limitation of the Eleventh Amendment's text to "the judicial power of
the United States,"100 and an impressive line of cases has narrowly
construed Congress's exceptional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to its power to enforce the
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Reconstruction Amendments. 101 The important point about all
of this is that state sovereign immunity does not protect a single
square inch of state regulatory "turf from federal intrusion; it simply exempts the states from (one means of) accountability when
they themselves violate federal law.102
A final, less frequently remarked instance of immunity federalism appears in the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Although
habeas has recently played a prominent role in the national War
on Terror as a remedy for detention by national executive authorities, by far its most common use is as a vehicle for collateral review
of state criminal convictions for compliance with the procedural
requirements of federal constitutional law.103 Habeas corpus is
thus another mechanism for holding states accountable when they
violate federal law, and the extensive jurisprudence of the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts limiting the scope of federal habeas review is thus another instance of immunity federalism.104 (In
this, it is worth noting, the Court has been encouraged and even
surpassed by Congress itself, which passed extensive restrictions on
habeas as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act in 1996.)105 Importantly, the number of state sovereign immunity and habeas corpus decisions by the Supreme Court over the
course of the "federalist revival" dwarfs the number of cases considering substantive limitations on Congress's powers.

The point of this survey of the multifarious models of contemporary federalism doctrine is to show that dual federalism and
managerial decentralization are not the only choices for allocating
authority between the national government and the states, and that
dual sovereignty may be maintained in other ways than by defining separate and exclusive spheres of state and national authority. These models, like any analytical construct imposed upon an
unruly and variegated set of real-world decisions and structures,
are vague around the edges, often overlap, and indeed may not
be mutually exclusive; process federalism, for example, can be a
valuable tool to preserve some measure of state sovereignty in an
institutional structure of cooperative federalism. The important
point is that there is a tendency to assume that any rule of law that
accords some measure of sovereignty to state governments is an
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instance of "dual federalism," but we should resist that tendency. It
is of course a prerogative of scholars to define terms any way that
we want, but we lose valuable analytical distinctions when we lump
together approaches that are in fact quite different.
2. T H E C U R R E N T STATE OF PLAY

Having sketched out the dual federalist model and its competitors, we are in a position to evaluate which of these models best reflects the current state of affairs in intergovernmental practice and
constitutional doctrine. My principal contention is that, although
scholars and sometimes dissenting judges often worry that the
Supreme Court is about to revive dual federalism, it has not in fact
done so and is extremely unlikely to do so in the future. Current
doctrine and practice instead reflect a blend of managerial decentralization, cooperative federalism, and process federalism.
The Court's restraint, however, has sometimes been unidirectional—that is, it has generally rejected dual federalism in its cases
limiting national power, but has often embraced it in its cases limiting state power. These cases tend to define an exclusive sphere
of federal authority—most often involving foreign affairs or immigration, but sometimes more prosaic fields like banking—and
presumptively exclude state regulatory activity touching on those
fields. Neither the results nor the reasoning is categorical, and the
Court has actually left far more room for state activity within these
presumptively federal spheres than it might have in the heyday of
dual federalism. Nonetheless, these cases represent a troubling
movement back in the direction of the old unworkable doctrine.
Dual Federalism Is Dead
Dual federalism dominated constitutional law for roughly a century and a half. Beginning in cases like Gibbons, the Court sought
to define separate and exclusive spheres of state and federal authority. Because Congress was not eager to exercise its affirmative
regulatory powers for most of the nineteenth century, most of
the cases involved challenges to state regulation under either the
dormant Commerce Clause or the judge-made "general common
law"—both of which effectively forbade state intrusion into the
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"national" sphere of interstate commerce. 105 As federal regulatory
efforts increased around the turn of the twentieth century, the
courts began to employ dual federalism to restrict those efforts,
either by construing federal statutes narrowly to avoid intruding
on state spheres of authority 107 or simply by striking them down.108
The Court upheld as many statutes as it struck down, however,
even during the infamous Lochner era. It was thus forced to draw
increasingly fine distinctions between goods that were in the
"stream of commerce" and those that were not, or between "direct"
and "indirect" effects on the interstate market.109 The advent of
the New Deal put increasing pressure on these distinctions, and
the Court's eventual capitulation to the national regulatory state
in 1937 ultimately swept them away. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,11" the Court signaled that it would no longer distinguish
between phases of the production cycle—that is, between regulation of "manufacturing" or "employment," which had heretofore
been a state sphere, and the actual buying, selling, or transport
of goods. And in Wickard v. Filburn,ul decided five years later, a
unanimous court held that Congress may regulate even individual
activities with a minimal impact on commerce, so long as in the
aggregate that class of activity would have a substantial effect on
the interstate market. By 1950, Edward Corwin could say that the
"entire system of constitutional interpretation" embodied in dual
federalism lay "in ruins."112
The question, of course, is whether the "federalist revival" of
the Rehnquist Court (and possibly the Roberts Court) has revived
dual federalism. Professor Barber and a surprising number of
other critics seem to think that it has.113 Barber fears a "recrudescence of state sovereignty" under which "the states' rights bloc on
the Rehnquist Court [has] affirmed the contract theory [under
which the states are "separate and independent sovereigns who
could nullify unconstitutional national acts and even withdraw
from the union"] and voided numerous national acts in the name
of 'state sovereignty.'"114 There are, however, very few citations.
The only case from this period that Barber actually mentions by
name is U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,115 which he takes to represent "an endorsement of the contract theory by four members of
the Rehnquist Court."116 One can quibble about whether even that
is really true—Term Limits grappled with the Framers' theory of
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representation in order to construe whether the Constitution's Qualifications Clauses for members of Congress were exclusive, not the
limits of Congress's regulatory powers, and invoking the contract
theory for the former purpose is quite different from using it to
determine the latter. 1 " But putting that aside, Justice Thomas's
opinion in Term Limits was a dissent. It struck down nothing and has
not been an important source of guidance for any of the decisions
in which the Court has struck down federal statutes. Moreover,
even Justice Thomas has made clear that he has a sophisticated
theory of the Supremacy Clause (which was not at issue in Term
Limits) that allows broad scope for federal authority.118
The best cases for a dual federalist revival would be United States
v. Lopez,119 in which the Court struck down the federal Gun Free
School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause, and United States v. Morrison,120 in which the
Court similarly invalidated the private civil suit provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act. Lopez was certainly exciting, in
the sense that it was the first time that the Court had struck down
a federal statute under the Commerce Clause since the New Deal
revolution, and many of us took Morrison as confirming that Lopez
was not a sport and the Court was, in fact, serious about limiting national power. Neither of these cases, however, amounted to a return
to the traditional doctrine of dual federalism. As I have discussed in
more detail elsewhere,121 both cases turned on whether Congress
was regulating an act that was "commercial" in nature. The Lopez
Court explicitly reaffirmed Wickard v. Filburn122 and the rest of its
post-New Deal jurisprudence, 123 and it denned "commercial" activity so broadly that there are no substantive fields of regulatory
concern in which many, if not most, activities will not be subject to
federal regulation.124 Equally important, both Lopez and Morrison
made clear that the Court had abandoned the distinction—initially
drawn by John Marshall in Gibbons—between commerce "among
the several states" and "the exclusively internal commerce of a
State."125 The Rehnquist Court, in other words, was significantly less
committed to dual federalism than is "Marshallian federalism."
In any event, the excitement over Lopez and Morrison was shortlived. Five years after Morrison, in Gonzales v. Raich,126 the Court
affirmed Congress's power to regulate the medicinal use of homegrown marijuana, notwithstanding the fact that the marijuana in
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question had been neither purchased nor transported across a
state line. And the Court considered it legally irrelevant that California had enacted a regulatory scheme licensing and regulating
the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. 127 Justice Kennedy
joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion, signaling that he was
unwilling to find that any significant federal regulatory program
lacked the requisite link to commercial activity. And, perhaps most
damaging of all to any hopes of a return to dual federalism, Justice
Scalia wrote a concurrence embracing a broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which would allow Congress' to regulate
even noncommercial activity so long as it bears some relation to a
commercial activity that Congress can reach.128
The Court's recent decision on the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) complicates the picture somewhat,
but none of the justices endorsed a return to dual federalism. In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),129 a majority of the Court upheld the act's "individual mandate" that all
persons must buy health insurance under the taxing power,130 but a
different majority opined that the mandate did exceed the limits of
Congress's commerce power.131 That portion of the opinion—the
most relevant for our purposes—did not suggest that health care
is somehow an exclusively state sphere of regulation. Rather, the
Chief Justice and the four dissenters agreed that the Commerce
Clause does not permit Congress to regulate pure inactivity—that
is, the decision not to buy health insurance. 132 This is an important holding, both because the PPACA is an important statute and
because it reverses the post-Raich impression that the Court might
be ready to abandon Lopez and Morrison. But there are not many
such mandates in federal law, and the Court's holding at most
places a particular regulatory tool off limits rather than isolating
a substantive field of regulation as beyond federal competence. 133
Finally, when Professor Barber refers to "numerous national
acts" that the Rehnquist Court has "voided . . . in the name of 'state
sovereignty,' "1M he can only be referring to the Court's admittedly
impressive string of holdings under the Eleventh Amendment
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. I agree that these cases are
wrongly decided and that they represent an unhelpful focus on
state sovereignty rather than state regulatory autonomy.135 But they
hardly represent a return to dual federalism.136 First, these cases
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simply invalidate provisions of the relevant federal acts that subject the states to suits by private individuals for money damages;
they do not invalidate the underlying substantive requirements
of the relevant acts, which continue to bind even the states. It is
thus impossible to say that these decisions carve out any exclusive
sphere of state authority; they simply restrict the remedies available when states violate the law. Second, these remedial restrictions are radically incomplete: they do not bar suits against state
officers for prospective relief or for damages when the officers are
sued in their individual capacity. Nor do they bar even suits against
the state itself for damages when the United States is the plaintiff or when Congress, through its power of the purse, induces the
states to waive their immunity. All these "workarounds" significantly minimize the practical significance of state sovereign immunity.137 Finally, the Court seems to be in substantial retreat from
these holdings, having upheld congressional provisions abrogating state sovereign immunity in several recent decisions.138
Sixty years later, Professor Corwin is still right: dual federalism lies "in ruins." What we have instead is a complicated and not
always coherent set of doctrines emphasizing process federalism
(particularly in the Court's "clear statement" rules of statutory
construction),139 an important but narrow rule against "commandeering" state institutions operating within cooperative federalism
regimes, and (perhaps) even narrower rules prohibiting use of the
commerce power to reach pockets of activity that either have no
relation to commerce (Lopez and Morrison) or do not even amount
to activity at all (NFIB). The Necessary and Proper Clause, moreover, looms as a congenial catchall power in doubtful cases.140
There are interesting debates to be had concerning whether the
Court's current doctrines—both permissive and restrictive—are
legitimate, whether they go far enough, and even whether the
courts are well suited to balance national and state authority. But it
will help, in approaching any of these questions, to appreciate how
much the ground has shifted since 1937.
Long Live Dual Federalism ?
Both the Court and the commentators have done their best to
inter dual federalism, and for the most part they have succeeded.
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But in some areas, dual federalism dies hard. To paraphrase Justice Scalia's famous description of the Lemon test in the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "Like some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, [dual federalism] stalks our [federalism] jurisprudence once again."141 Only this
time, it is frightening the proponents of state regulatory activity in
fields where the national government has traditionally played a
significant role. The tendency to revive dual federalist notions of
exclusive national power has been most pronounced in the area
of foreign relations law, including recent controversies of state
efforts to ratchet up the enforcement of federal laws regulating
undocumented aliens. But a similar, if more low-profile, trend has
surfaced in the Court's statutory preemption cases. The Court
would do better to bring each area into line with its more general federalism doctrine by giving these dual federalist tendencies
a speedy quietus.
I wrote in 2001 that the Court seemed to be clinging to a dual
federalist view in some of its foreign affairs cases by applying a
more vigorous rule of preemption. 142 In Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council,™ for example, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law limiting state dealings with companies doing business in
Burma, notwithstanding the absence' of any explicit federal statutory language preempting such state laws. More recently, the
Court seemed to extend Crosby in American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi,144 which struck down a California law requiring insurance companies to disclose any connection they might have to
Holocaust insurance policies, again in the absence of explicit preemptive language. Both decisions strongly suggested that the states
simply had no place regulating the business of foreign relations.
Likewise, in the last year, much of the debate concerning state
governmental initiatives to regulate illegal immigration has taken
a decidedly dual federalist turn. In particular, the Ninth Circuit's ruling striking down Arizona's restrictive immigration law
strongly suggested that states are simply incapable of regulating
immigration—this is an exclusively federal field.149 On review
in Arizona v. United States, however, the Supreme Court took a
more equivocal position. On the one hand, it suggested that im-
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migration must be a federal sphere by emphasizing that "foreign
countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the
50 separate States."146 On the other, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion also acknowledged that the states have a role to play in
this field, noting that "[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation
does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the
States."147 The Court's actual analysis stressed ordinary preemption
principles, not doctrines of federal exclusivity,148 although it does
seem fair to say that the Court applied those doctrines with a propreemption thumb on the scale.
Similar echoes of dual federalism can be found in the Court's
other preemption cases, where the Court often emphasizes traditional fields of state or federal regulatory authority. Rick Hills has
asserted that "the Roberts Court's [preemption] decisions seem to
follow a traditional script of dual federalism—that is, carving out
separate spheres for state and federal governments and enforcing
norms of mutual non-interference between these spheres."149 A
good example is United States v. Locke,150 in which the Court held
that federal law preempted Washington state regulations governing oil tanker safety in Puget Sound that went further than federal
requirements. The Court emphasized that maritime safety, which
implicated international obligations as well as domestic law, was a
traditionally federal field and thus refused to apply any presumption against a preemptive reading of the statute. Locke illustrates
not only the backward glance to dual federalism but also the trouble inherent in that glance; after all, it is equally easy to characterize Locke as a case about safeguarding the natural resources of the
state—a traditional state sphere. 151
In any event, efforts to revive dual federalism even in these
limited nationalist enclaves blink reality. As Grodzins has pointed
out, "[fjoreign affairs, national defense, and the development of
atomic energy are usually considered to be exclusive responsibilities of the national government. In fact, the state and local governments have extensive responsibilities, directly and indirectly, in
each of these fields."152 This has only become more true in the decades since Grodzins wrote.153 In our increasingly globalized world,
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no governmental actor—including states and even localities—can
avoid interacting with the rest of the world in a way that implicates
national foreign policy.154
This nationalist version of dual federalism should not be overstated, however. All the cases I have mentioned are statutory construction cases, not efforts to draw hard constitutional lines in the
sand, and cases like Arizona seem to leave significant room for state
regulation even in areas of federal primacy. Moreover, there are
plentiful counterexamples. Just this past term, for instance, the
Court upheld a different Arizona law providing for penalties on
employers who employ undocumented aliens.155 The Court not
only found the law not preempted; it also went out of its way to say
that the law did not implicate any unique field of federal authority.
We are far from a revival of dual federalism, but some of the cases
in these areas are worrisome nonetheless.
3. Is DUAL FEDERALISM "SELF-DEFEATING"?

This final section considers two distinct critiques of dual federalism. The first is Professor Barber's, which holds that dual federalism is necessarily incoherent because public goods like liberty and
democracy must be defined by national actors in a national forum,
leaving no room for more particularistic arguments from "states'
rights." The second is more in the vein of conventional wisdom,
which believes dual federalism became extinct because it was not
susceptible to principled application over time.
Professor Barber's Argument
The central claim of Professor Barber's essay is that dual federalism—by which, as I have said, he seems to mean dual sovereignty—
is logically self-defeating. "Should there be a dual federalist as well
as a national reading of. . . any . . . matter material to the federalism debate, including the nature of the Constitution as a whole—if
there is an interpretive choice of any description, dual federalism
will (or should) lose the debate."156 This proposition extends not
only to "the Supremacy Clause," but also to "the Tenth Amendment, or the enumeration of powers, or the breadth of national
powers, or the Framers' intentions, or the formation of the Union,
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or the nature of liberty."157 Every aspect of our constitutional law,
in other words, is to be construed in a nationalist way.
In assessing the scope of this proposition, much would seem to
depend on how often we think "there is an interpretive choice of
any description." On some issues there may not be. John Marshall
wrote in Gibbons, for example, that "[t]he enumeration [of federal powers] presupposes something not enumerated," 158 which
seems to mean that the very notion that the national government
must operate within finite bounds is not really open to question.
But that is arguably enough to decide a case like United States v.
Lopez;'59 the critical moment in that case occurred when Justice
O'Connor asked Solicitor General Drew Days whether, if the
Gun Free School Zones Act were constitutional, he could think
of anything Congress might do that would be outside its power.160
He could not, and that was that; the Court was simply unwilling
to transgress Marshall's principle that something must lie outside
Congress's enumerated powers.161 Although some very smart justices dissented in Lopez, I would be tempted to classify it as a case
in which there was not "an interpretive choice of any description."
I doubt, however, that Professor Barber would agree. Barber
sums up his argument this way:
The states' rights debate is a national debate, conducted in a national forum. An admittedly local good can't count as a reason in
that forum. The dual federalist who submits to the forum loses the
debate before it begins because the good that would justify dual federalism would be a nationally recognized good applied by a national
agency as a restraint on the states.162
It's hard to know what to make of this argument. As an empirical description of the actual debates that take place in national forums, it's simply incorrect. Consider, for example, a typical appropriations debate in Congress. A congressman may well argue for
a benefit to his local district—say, a "bridge to nowhere" or a research grant to a local university. To say that people cannot make
arguments based on local goods in a national forum is to ignore
what goes on in the halls of national government every day. Professor Barber's claim would also render incomprehensible Wechsler's
influential argument that the primary protection for state autonomy and prerogatives comes from the states' ability to argue for
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those things in a national forum—the Congress—through their
elected representatives. 163 If a national forum can consider only
"national goods"—whatever those are—then how are the "political safeguards of federalism" to operate?
Professor Barber's argument is also flatly inconsistent with the
role of national courts in enforcing the boundaries of state and
national authority in federal systems. Commentators often emphasize that arguments for limiting national power vis-a-vis the subnational units can and should be presented in a national forum—a
proposition that Barber argues is simply impossible. The European
jurist Koen Lenaerts, for instance, has stated that " [federalism is
present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national
or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court
of the common legal order."164 And, in fact, the constitutional
courts of many federal systems hear, with some regularity, the sorts
of claims that national power must be limited.165 Alphonso Lopez's
(victorious) lawyer would no doubt be surprised to hear that it is
impossible to make arguments for limiting national power vis-a-vis
the states in a national forum like the Supreme Court.
But perhaps Professor Barber means this to be a normative argument: the only reasons that should count in a national forum are
national reasons. It's not clear why this should be true; the argument that states' rights claims must fail because only national reasons should count seems to assume the very point in issue. But
even if we grant the premise, it is hardly clear that Barber's conclusion follows. On his view, the appropriation-seeking congressman
must explain why a federal expenditure in his district benefits the
nation as a whole. But can he not point out that few federal programs benefit all Americans at once, or evenly, and that by benefiting some (his constituents) we benefit the larger whole?166 That
is certainly the premise behind federal disaster relief funds, for
example. The broader point is that it may not always be easy to
distinguish between national and local goods.
The critical case of this ambiguity is the value of state sovereignty in checking national power. As Madison suggested in The
Federalist No. 51, federalism is a central ingredient in our system of
checks and balances, part of the "double security" for individual
liberty at the heart of the Constitution. 167 If that is right, then why
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isn't state sovereignty itself a national good? If it is, then it seems to
me that Professor Barber's argument collapses in on itself.168
Professor Barber seems to deny that checks and balances can
itself be a national good when he says that "Marshall's was a positive
constitutionalism; dual federalism belongs to a tradition of negative constitutionalism. Marshall's positive constitutionalism makes
more sense than negative constitutionalism because establishing
a government to pursue good things makes sense while establishing a government mainly to prevent government from doing bad
things makes no sense."169 This is a highly contestable assertion, of
course.170 Much of constitutional law is concerned with preventing
government from doing bad things.171 The original Constitution
was obsessed with dividing and checking governmental power,172
and Barber's dismissal of "negative constitutionalism" (it "makes
no sense") condemns not only federalism but also separation of
powers and individual rights. It would condemn Marshall's own
jurisprudence, which struck down governmental action when it
transgressed constitutional limitations.173 Moreover, limiting the
power of the national government is not simply a "negative" enterprise. Much of the point is to preserve the autonomy of state governments to pursue their own "positive" programs—for example,
permitting gay marriage and medicinal marijuana, or protecting the environment more rigorously than federal law—without
national interference. 174
In any event, Professor Barber's claim that proponents of state
sovereignty simply can't argue for that value in a national forum
like Congress or the Supreme Court 175 reminds me of Mark
Twain's reply when asked if he believed in infant baptism: "Of
course I do," he said. "I've seen it done." People who believe in
state sovereignty do make these arguments in national forums, and
they are unlikely to stop simply because someone tells them that
it's impossible. It is far better, in my view, to engage the arguments
that people actually do make on their merits.
Determinate Line Drawing and the Frankfurter Constraint
All that said, I agree with Professor Barber that dual federalism—
defined considerably more narrowly than he suggests—is a failed
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approach; I simply disagree about the reason for that failure. Our
disagreement has practical consequences. For one thing, our contrasting accounts of the reason dual federalism must fail point in
different directions for the use of dual federalist doctrines to limit
state authority. If the problem with dual federalism is that we need
a single nationalist vision of liberty and democracy, then we have
every reason to defend exclusive zones of national authority, like
foreign affairs or immigration, from intrusions by the states.176
But if, as I argue in this section, the real trouble is that exclusive
spheres of authority simply cannot be defined and maintained in
a principled way, then that difficulty will plague dual federalism
whether it is used to restrict state or national power.
Dual federalism was primarily a model ofjudicial review, and as
such it had to be amenable to the institutional constraints faced by
courts. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere, 1 ' 7 the primary
constraint on courts is that they must make decisions according
to law; to invoke Hamilton again, they must exercise "judgment,"
not "will."178 Or, as Wechsler put it, judicial decision making must
be "principled" in a way that legislative decision making need not
be.179 Most assessments of dual federalism have agreed that dual
federalism failed because, especially as the national economy became more integrated and the public came to expect more from
government, the separate spheres model became incapable of
principled application. As Vicki Jackson has observed, "[W]ithout
written guideposts on the content of the enclaves in the face of
changing economies and functions of government, the substantive
enclave theory is unworkable."180
In the 1930s, Felix Frankfurter published an analysis of the
Supreme Court's nineteenth-century decisions construing the
boundaries of dual federalism under the Commerce Clause that
emphasized the Court's need and desire to avoid the appearance
of "judicial policy-making."181 Larry Lessig calls this the "Frankfurter Constraint," and he contends that it is fundamental to judicial legitimacy.182 "[A] rule is an inferior rule," he writes, "if, in its
application, it appears to be political, in the sense of appearing
to allow extra-legal factors to control its application." 183 And when
the Court perceives that it is incurring costs to its legitimacy by
pursuing a doctrinal rule perceived to be political, we can expect
the Court to abandon that rule and try something else.184
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So it was with dual federalism. A doctrinal model that calls
upon the Court to define and police separate and exclusive
spheres of state and national authority puts enormous pressure
on the Court's ability to draw the boundary line in a principled
and consistent way.185 After a century and a half of trying to draw
lines between commercial and police powers regulation, 186 essentially national and essentially local regulation, 187 manufacturing
and commerce, 188 items in the "stream of commerce" and those
without,189 and "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce,190 the Court found itself under fire for its inability to seem
principled in that effort.191 Perhaps these doctrinal distinctions
collapsed under their own weight, causing the Court to change
course.192 Perhaps the perceived inconsistency of the Court's results helped mobilize popular support for President Roosevelt's
"court-packing" plan, and the threat of that plan in turn caused
the Court's "switch in time."193 Either way, the point is that the
essential indeterminacy of the line between state and national
spheres was a key factor in dual federalism's demise.
If this is right, then at least as a historical matter, dual federalism
did not die because there is anything fundamentally incoherent
about the notion of state sovereignty or differing state conceptions
of democracy or liberty. There is, then, no necessary impediment
to alternative models of dual sovereignty that do not raise the
same line-drawing problems. 194 Moreover, if indeterminacy is the
root problem with dual federalism, then that problem will afflict
any dual federalist model, including one that restricts state power
as much as one that restricts national power. The persistent nostalgia for exclusive zones of national power over areas like foreign
affairs or immigration, then, remains puzzling.
4. CONCLUSION

Justice O'Connor said in A ^ York v. United States that "discerning
the proper division of authority between the Federal Government
and the States" is "our oldest question of constitutional law."195 But
the persistence of that question should not blind us to the ways
in which the federalism debate has changed over the course of
our history. Although the dual federalist model dominated that
debate for the first century and a half, it collapsed in 1937 and has
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found few adherents since. Dual sovereignty remains, and a variety of other models for preserving the constitutional equilibrium
between the nation and the states have arisen to take dual federalism's place. But outside of a few pockets wherein the courts seek
to maintain exclusive zones of national control over foreign affairs,
immigration, and the like, dual federalism has given way to cooperative federalism, subsidiarity, process federalism, and sovereign
immunity.
I fear, however, that the puzzling persistence of dual federalism
as an analytical category, particularly among critics of the Supreme
Court's efforts to enforce constitutional constraints on national
power, has distorted federalism's research agenda. We spend too
much time discussing the follies of exclusive subject matter categories as a tool for dividing state and federal regulatory jurisdiction,
and far too little analyzing the models of federalism that are actually in play. Any number of more fruitful projects call out for study:
we are beginning to have some helpful analyses and case studies of
the impact of political parties on the political safeguards of federalism, for example, but much more remains to be done. Heather
Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen's theoretical account of "uncooperative federalism" called for careful analyses of the way that
state and national administrators actually interact in practice, but
relatively few have answered the call. And little has been done to
bridge the gap between scholars of public administration steeped
in the practical intricacies of fiscal federalism and legal scholars
analyzing how to interpret the Spending Clause.
Vestiges of dual federalism should be rooted out, and the Court
should be warned against tendencies toward relapse. But for the
most part, the horse of dual federalism is dead, and we should quit
beating it. The more fundamental debate about dual sovereignty,
however, remains worth having.

NOTES
I initially contributed this essay to the American Society for Political and
Legal Philosophy's Annual Meeting, panel on "Federalism and Subsidiarity: Against Dual Federalism," which convened in August 2011, and I
have revised it only slighdy in light of the Supreme Court's health care
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and immigration decisions in June 2012.1 am grateful to Jim Fleming and
Jacob Levy for inviting me to participate and to Sotirios Barber, whose
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